How emotions shape foreign policy: German MPs’ feelings linked to risk choices on Ukraine arms, new thesis finds
Laurence Kroese's master thesis investigates the link between emotions and decision-making under risk from an international relations perspective.
A new master’s thesis from the Center for Geopolitics, Peace, and Security argues that the feelings policymakers bring into the room can tilt how they judge risk—and thus what they advocate—for in high-stakes foreign policy debates.
In an exploratory “plausibility probe” of German federal legislators, Laurence Matthias Kroese links core affect (valence and arousal) to risk-taking tendencies on the contentious question of German weapons deliveries to Ukraine. The study suggests that more positively valenced and higher-arousal states correlate with fewer proposed restrictions on arms transfers, while negatively valenced and lower-arousal states align with tighter constraints.
Why it matters
- The study connects psychological measures of emotion to concrete policy advocacy, addressing a persistent gap in orthodox International Relations (IR) theory, which often invokes emotions (like “fear”) without specifying how they operate.
- It challenges blanket assumptions—especially in liberal IR theory—that domestic actors are uniformly risk-averse, and it offers a micro-level mechanism that could inform neorealist debates over elite consensus and (under)balancing.
- As governments across Europe weigh arms supplies, escalation risks, and alliance signaling, the thesis points to emotion as a subtle but systematic input into risk perception and policy design.
What the researcher did
- Sample: Three sitting members of the German Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee (Auswärtiger Ausschuss), interviewed in September 2025. Two were from the governing Social Democratic Party (SPD), one from the Christian Social Union (CSU).
- Method: Short, semi-structured interviews featuring five brief video stimuli on Russia–NATO–Ukraine themes. After each clip, respondents marked their affect on a two-dimensional “Circumplex” grid (valence: negative to positive; arousal: low to high). They then answered concise policy questions.
- Focus: While five themes were tested, the analysis zeroes in on “Theme 3” (German weapons deliveries to Ukraine), where affect and policy positions aligned most cleanly.
What the researcher found
- All three MPs supported continued arms deliveries—but diverged on conditions.
- The CSU respondent reported positive valence and higher arousal and favored fewer restrictions.
- The two SPD respondents reported negative valence and lower arousal and favored more constraints (e.g., limiting range, emphasizing defensive use, and conditioning deliveries on wartime use).
- This pattern is consistent with an “affect heuristic” in which:
- Positive affect nudges policymakers toward more optimistic assessments of outcomes (lower perceived downside risk) and relatively more risk-seeking stances.
- Negative affect nudges toward more pessimistic assessments (higher perceived downside risk) and relatively more risk-averse stances.
The theory behind the link
- Circumplex Model of Affect: Emotions can be mapped along two dimensions—valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal (activation level). Respondents self-reported their states after each video.
- Prospect Theory: People evaluate risky choices relative to a reference point and overweight/underweight probabilities in systematic ways. The thesis leverages findings showing that:
- Positive affect can inflate estimated frequencies of favorable outcomes; negative affect can inflate estimated frequencies of unfavorable outcomes.
- Higher arousal can increase reliance on affect in judgments under uncertainty.
- In the Ukraine arms case, the author argues that affect mainly shaped “decision weights”—how likely MPs judged good and bad outcomes—rather than the intrinsic value they assigned to those outcomes.
Implications for IR theory
- Liberalism (Moravcsik): The thesis qualifies the assumption that domestic actors are generally risk-averse. It shows how affect can push elites toward more or less risk acceptance depending on valence and arousal, creating variation even within governing coalitions. Practically, affective diversity may drive compromise—yielding de facto risk-averse outcomes when negatively valenced actors insist on constraints.
- Neorealism (Schweller): The findings hint at an affective micro-mechanism within “elite consensus” and “elite cohesion.” Divergent affective responses among elites can translate into disagreements over the scope and conditions of balancing measures—potentially shaping whether states underbalance, appropriately balance, or overbalance against threats.
Caveats and limitations
- Small N: Just three sitting MPs were analyzed (a fourth interview was excluded due to technical issues), limiting generalizability.
- Stimulus design: Clips were non-randomized, and targets of affect could be ambiguous (e.g., one SPD respondent focused on a figure in the video rather than the peace-talks theme itself in another section).
- No baseline mood: Without pre-interview mood measures, distinguishing incidental from integral affect is difficult.
- Measurement: A single-point self-report on the Circumplex grid can’t capture mixed or discrete emotions; facial expression notes (no video recordings) were used cautiously and not as definitive evidence.
- Context: Real-world policy is iterative and collective; the study focuses on an individual-level mechanism.
What’s next
The author calls the study a feasibility test of “importing a simple dimensional affect measure into political elite IR research,” and outlines improvements for future work:
- Larger, more diverse samples (including diplomats and bureaucrats, who are more accessible than MPs).
- Randomized stimuli and multiple angles of a single policy theme to clarify targets of affect.
- Baseline mood checks and, when feasible, controlled Prospect Theory tasks embedded in interviews.
- Longitudinal designs to track how affect and advocacy evolve.
- Attention to gender and other demographic moderators of affect–risk links.
The bottom line
Emotions aren’t just rhetorical flourishes in foreign policy—they can shift how leaders judge probabilities and calibrate risk. In a tightly focused German case, positive affect aligned with fewer constraints on Ukraine arms deliveries and negative affect with tighter guardrails. That pattern doesn’t rewrite IR theory, but it sharpens it: micro-level affect may help explain when and why risk preferences diverge within governments, and how those divergences shape the compromises that become state policy.
About the study
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Title: “Emotion and International Relations. The affective state of individuals and decision-making under risk in International Relations.”
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Author: Laurence Matthias Kroese
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Program: Master’s thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies
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Institution: Center for Geopolitics, Peace, and Security
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Date: May 2026
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Supervisor: Prof. Ana Luisa Sanchez Laws
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