Trust in North Norway is central to the ability for the Norwegian state to defend itself. The project asks: how does the level of social trust affect societal resilience? And what role does societal resilience play in ‘Total Defence’?
Trust in North Norway is central to the ability for the Norwegian state to defend itself. The project asks: how does the level of social trust affect societal resilience? And what role does societal resilience play in ‘Total Defence’?
Background
North Norway plays a central role in the defence of the Norwegian state. It shares a border with a powerful neighbour, Russia, which has been progressively increasing its military presence in the north and protecting its nuclear base on the Kola Peninsula. It is also a region that has increasingly captured the interest of China, not least as a potential central transport hub (Kirkenes) for future shipping through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The region continues to be a central source of Norwegian economic growth due to its wealth of natural resources, but it suffers a population drain. Politically, the region has been frequently at odds with the central government in Oslo on a host of issues—from the forced merging of the Finnmark and Troms county, central government refusals to improve transport infrastructure, (including extending train service to the north), to significantly different perceptions of security (e.g.: the US submarine base conflict; focus on cooperation with Russia and reassurance rather than deterrence). 2019 saw the Centre Party (Senterpartiet) gain the majority of support in North Norway with a form of populist rhetoric against the dominance of the elite, namely traditional parties that have not served the region well.
The Project
The vulnerabilities of North Norway become increasingly relevant owing to the rising potential for new forms of threats—which are defined in the project as hybrid/grey zone threats. In this context, the project examines the importance of societal trust, which is multi-dimensional, in relation to “resilience”–reflecting our ability (or not) to withstand threats. A state’s capacity or resilience to combat cyber and disinformation-related threats is greatly dependent on the resilience of its population. The civilian domain is evermore a primary target – via cyberattacks on crucial infrastructure that people rely upon daily, disinformation campaigns which target existing social vulnerabilities, and even targeted financial investments by either state or non-state actors as political influence/manipulation measures.
Moreover, Norway’s total defence concept relies upon close cooperation between civilian and military to most effectively defend its borders, but this is difficult when attacks are not traditionally military in nature, but instead are digital and/or under-threshold attacks with a goal to weaken or destabilise a society. These new hybrid (sammensatte trusler) threats highlight the roles of both the civilian population and the role of cyber defence in the total defence concept, which the project focuses upon.
The project entails surveys, interviews, citizen cafés to ascertain societal trust levels in selected communities in North Norway (Tromsø, Kirkenes, Alta, Kautokeino, Narvik, Bodø) in the light of 1. potential or real threat perceptions regarding relations with Russia and China, 2. Perceptions of lack of political power in relation to Oslo (populism). Furthermore, interviews will be conducted to gauge the levels of cooperation and role defining between military branches, with a particular focus on the newer branch – Cyber defence – and its role in under-threshold (non-force based) threats targeting society and authorities, as well as how Cyber defence contributes to the civil-military cooperation constellation.
The impacts of state and non-state actors on civilian communities by the use of various cyber-attack techniques, not least mis- and disinformation, demonstrates how average people are being increasingly pulled into direct elements of conflict. How are civilians “resilient” against geopolitical interests? So-called traditional branches of the military may not be the “first responders” to non-lethal, “under threshold” attacks. One of the most important military branches to mitigate attacks against the civilian domain is cyber defence. How is cyber defence effectively integrated into Total Defence planning?
Objectives
Deliverables will include: concrete exercise scenarios (TTX); policy briefs; outreach to Norwegian media; academic articles as well as one book “Security and Technology” (Oxford University Press, publisher agreement pending). The project is associated with EU-HYBNET – an EU network cooperating on combating hybrid threats. Cooperation will also be provided with UiT departments of media studies, language and culture (housing the THREAT DEFUSER project in which Hoogensen Gjørv is a partner), and technology and security.
The project will be carried out primarily by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv (Project Leader), Marc Lanteigne, Marcus Buck and Jonas Stein (all UiT) in cooperation with Hanne Eggen Røislien at Cyber Defence, and LtCol Jardar Gjørv at the Army Staff (civil-military cooperation). Advisory support will be provided by LtCol Geir Hågen Karlsen, Norwegian Staff College. The project will be further supported by The Grey Zone.