Three Philosophers, one morning

Oystein Linnebø: "Reference and criteria of identity"

My talk aims to provide an accessible overview of a monograph I am currently completing. The book defends a Frege-inspired approach to reference and ontology. One central idea is that an object is anything to which we can refer; another is that the provision of a suitable criterion of identity suffices for successful reference. Together, these ideas ensure that the existence of many kinds of object is (in a sense I aspire to make precise) not a "big deal". 

 

Andras Szigeti:  "Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency"

This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. These conceptual considerations favouring moderate individualism are strengthened by an analysis of our moral practice of responding to collective shortfalls of rationality and by the unpalatable moral implications of collectivism about epistemic agency. There is no need to change the subject. Groups can be rational or irrational, but they do not reason.

Reidar Lie: "The devil is in the details: how can Philosophy be relevant for policy?"

The lecture will discuss attempts by philosophers to tackle current moral issues, such as global justice or fair allocation of health care resources. Specifically, Thomas Pogge's Health Impact Fund will be used as an example. I will argue that these attempts are rarely successful, and do not really address the central moral issues. I will argue that philosophers who want to be relevant must pay careful attention to both the empirical facts and to unresolved theoretical and conceptual issues.